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PITFALLS ASSOCIATED WITH THE OHIO
SAVING STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
Saving statutes afford a plaintiff whose timely commenced ac-
tion is dismissed for various procedural reasons a specified time in
which to bring a second action. Such statutes are perfectly consistent
with the goals statutes of limitations are designed to serve. Statutes
of limitations
promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The
theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and
that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over
the right to prosecute them.'
Since saving statutes are available only to plaintiffs whose actions
were timely commenced, they are not at odds with any policy of
preventing unfair surprise.
The Ohio saving statute is embodied in Ohio Revised Code
§ 2305.19.2 Thirty states in addition to Ohio have provided by statute
for the bringing of a new action after a timely commenced first action
has failed otherwise than upon its merits.' These statutes appear to
have their origins in the English Limitation Act of 1623.4 The first
I Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
2 Section 2305.19 of the Ohio Revised Code provides in part:
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, if in due time a
judgement for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon
the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action at the date of
reversal or failure has expired, the plaintiff, or, if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives may commence a new action within one year after such
date.
I See a listing of these states and their statutes at Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co.,
380 U.S. 424, 431 n.9 (1965).
421 Jac. 1, ch. 16, § 4:
If in any of the said actions or suits, judgment be given for the plaintiff, and
the same be reversed by error, or a verdict pass for the plaintiff, and upon matter
alleged in arrest of judgment, the judgment be given against the plaintiff, that he take
nothing by his plaint, writ, or bill; or if any of the said actions shall be brought by
original, and the defendant therein be outlawed, and shall after reverse the outlawry;
that in all such cases the party plaintiff, his heirs, executors or administrators, as
the case shall require, may commence a new action or suit, from time to time, within
a year after such judgment reversed, or such given against the plaintiff, or outlawry
reversed, and not after.
Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 537, 109 N.E. 594, 595 (1915).
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Ohio saving statute was enacted in 18315 and has been a source of
litigation ever since.
The Ohio saving statute, while remedial in nature, presents many
pitfalls for the unwary practitioner. Most of the litigation concerning
this statute has centered around two of these pitfalls: (1) the meaning
of "failure otherwise than upon the merits" and (2) the meaning of
"commenced or attempted to be commenced" as these phrases are
used in the statute. This note will explore the parameters of the Ohio
saving statute, in an effort to set forth the various facets of these
frequently recurring pitfalls.
II. THE MEANING OF "FAILURE OTHERWISE THAN UPON THE
MERITS"
A. The Problem of Voluntary Dismissals
Manos v. Jackson6 is a typical recent case of misplaced reliance
on the Ohio saving statute. The plaintiff, Emanuel Manos, who was
injured in an automobile collision on July 16, 1970, commenced a
personal injury action against the defendants on November 20, 1970.
That action was dismissed without prejudice upon plaintiff's motion
by the Summit County Court of Common Pleas on May 2, 1973. On
July 13, 1973, the plaintiff commenced this action in the same court,
alleging the same claims that were set forth in the dismissed com-
plaint. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the stat-
ute of limitations had run. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing
that he had a right to one dismissal, without prejudice, under rule
41(A),7 and that the dismissal of the former action was a "failure
otherwise than upon the merits" within the meaning of Revised Code
§ 2305.19. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the
plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff argued that rule 41(A) changes the
interpretation that should be placed upon Revised Code § 2305.19,
so that a voluntary dismissal should be considered as being a "fail-
ure otherwise than upon the merits." The court of appeals for Sum-
5 51 Laws of Ohio 61 (1853).
* 42 Ohio App. 2d 53, 328 N.E.2d 414 (1974).
OH-no R. Civ. P. 41(A)(1):
an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of the court (a) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before the commencement of trial unless a
counterclaim which cannot remain pending for independent adjudication by the court
has been served by the defendant or (b) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by
all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of
dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who
has once dismissed in any court, an action based on or including the same claim.
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mit County affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that rule
41(A) merely supplants Revised Code § 2323.05, but that it creates
no relief from the existing interpretation of the language in Revised
Code § 2305.19.
The case of Manos v. Jackson is not a particularly novel one.'
It is merely a recent application of the old rule that a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice is not a "failure otherwise than upon the
merits" within the meaning of Revised Code § 2305.19.10 The case is
worth noting, however, because it illustrates the fact that some Ohio
attorneys either have not learned the rule or still persist in challenging
it, often at great risk to their clients.
As early as 1893, in Siegfried v. Railroad Co.," the Ohio su-
preme court held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not
a failure in the action.
To fail, implies an effort or purpose to succeed. One cannot, pro-
perly, be said to fail in anything he does not undertake, nor, in an
undertaking which he voluntarily abandons. . . . A failure in the
action, by the plaintiff, otherwise than upon the merits, imports
some action by the court, by which the plaintiff is defeated without
a trial upon the merits.'
The 1931 case of Buehrer v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co.'3 reaf-
firmed the holding of Siegfried, and it is the law of Ohio today.
In Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.," the
trial court sustained a demurrer to an amended petition on the ground
of misjoinder of parties defendant, whereupon the plaintiff voluntar-
ily dismissed the action without prejudice. The Ohio supreme court
held that such a dismissal without prejudice constituted a failure
"otherwise than upon the merits," thus enabling the plaintiff to take
advantage of the saving provisions of Revised Code § 2305.19. The
court in Cero was careful to distinguish both Siegfried and Buehrer.
Revised Code § 2323.05 read, in pertinent part:
An action may be dismissed without prejudice to a future action:
(A) By the plaintiff, before its final submission to the jury, or to the court, when
the trial is by the court...
Section 2323.05(A) was supplanted by rule 41(A); see note 22 infra.
See, e.g., Hayden v. Ford Motor Co., 364 F. Supp. 398 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
10 The fact that a dismissal is granted "without prejudice" to the commencement of a new
action bears more on the question of the finality of the judgment in general than it does upon
the question of the applicability of the saving statute.
" 50 Ohio St. 294, 34 N.E. 331 (1893).
1 Id. at 296, 34 N.E. at 332.
' 123 Ohio St. 264, 175 N.E. 25 (1931).
" 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774 (1960).
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In those two cases, the court noted, the actions were voluntarily
dismissed. Such dismissals were not attributable to an adverse ruling
by the court, as in Cero.15
In the wake of Cero, and despite the language in Cero which
distinguished both Siegfried and Buehrer, some practitioners labored
under the mistaken conception that Cero had abrogated the Siegfried
and Buehrer holdings and had held that any voluntary nonsuit or
dismissal of a case before judgment qualified as a case which failed
"otherwise than upon the merits." Such contention was rejected in
the 1969 case of Beckner v. Stover.6 In Beckner the plaintiff brought
an action for personal injury that came on for trial subsequent to the
running of the statute of limitations. Prior to a noon recess, the last
defense witness had been excused by both parties. When court was
reconvened, the plaintiff requested further cross-examination of the
excused witness. The trial court would permit neither the recall of the
witness, nor the introduction of certain other evidence, whereupon the
plaintiff moved that her case be dismissed without prejudice. The
plaintiff refiled her action the same afternoon, and the trial court
sustained a motion by the defendant to dismiss. The court of appeals
reversed.
In holding that such a voluntary dismissal was not a failure
otherwise than upon the merits within the meaning of Revised Code
§ 2305.19, the Ohio supreme court distinguished the "adverse rul-
ings" in Cero from those in Beckner. In Cero, the sustaining of two
successive demurrers to the plaintiff's petition virtually forced the
plaintiff to dismiss the action. In Beckner, the trial court was merely
requiring the parties to tailor their conduct to fit that court's opinion
of judicatory decorum.
The court in Beckner gave a convincing policy argument for its
decision:
To hold otherwise would be to establish a rule whereby litigants
could substitute a voluntary dismissal without prejudice for an ap-
peal from claimed errors occurring during a trial. Under such a
practice, parties could try and retry their causes indefinitely until
the most favorable circumstances for submission were finally
achieved. In our opinion, Section 2305.19 neither provides for nor
permits such a practice. 7
A final point worth noting about Beckner is that the court there
Id. at 85-86, 167 N.E.2d at 777.
" 18 Ohio St. 2d 36, 247 N.E.2d 300 (1969).
'7 Id. at 40, 247 N.E.2d at 302.
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did not find § 2323.05(A), Revised Code, 8 to be at odds with the
saving statute. Although § 2323.05 did give a plaintiff authority to
dismiss his action without prejudice at any time prior to its final
submission to the jury or court, the court explained that the prosecu-
tion of new proceedings on a cause so dismissed is governed by the
applicable statute of limitations.
All of the above cited cases, dealing with the effect of a voluntary
dismissal on the application of the saving statute, were decided prior
to the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970. Only
one post-rules case dealing with this subject, Brookman v. Northern
Trading Co., 9 was decided before Manos v. Jackson. The decision
of the Tenth District Court of Appeals in Brookman was relied upon
heavily by the court in Manos v. Jackson to justify its holding. In
Brookrnan, counsel for plaintiff took the position that the voluntary
dismissal of a prior action based on the same claim, being the first
one filed by the plaintiff in the trial court, was totally without preju-
dice and, under rule 41(A)(1), carried an immunity from the possible
operation of Revised Code § 2305.19. Counsel urged that there was
an existing conflict between the statute and the rule which the Ohio
constitution resolves in favor of the rule.2"
The Tenth District Court of Appeals made short shrift of this
argument. It explained that rule 41(A)(1) 2 merely supplants Revised
Code § 2323.05, and that the rule creates no relief from the provisions
of Revised Code § 2305.19.22
11 See note 8 supra.
11 33 Ohio App. 2d 250, 294 N.E.2d 912 (1972).
20 OHIO CON sT. art. IV, § 5(B):
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect.
21 See note 7 supra.
2 Beckner v. Stover, n. 16, supra; Staff Notes to OHIO R. Civ. P. 41, OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. (Page 1971) warn:
Rule 41(A)(1) and voluntary dismissal without prejudice without a court order
before commencement of trial may be limited by court interpretation of the "savings
statute," § 2305.19, R.C. The statute provides for recommencement of the action
within one year "if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits." If plaintiff
voluntarily dismisses without a court order under Rule 41(A)(1) and after the applic-
able statute of limitations has run for his particular action, has he failed otherwise
than on the merits and may he file over again under the "savings statute"? The
answer is not clear; hence plaintiff would be taking a dangerous chance.
When the rules were amended (the changes having become effective July 1, 1971), minor
changes were made in rule 41, but no clarification as to its applicability to Revised Code §
2305.19 was made. At the time of revision, the supreme court had the Beckner decision before
it. The passage of Amended House Bill 1201, effective July 1, 1971 (133 Laws of Ohio 3017)
repealed a large number of statutes that were found to be in conflict with the Rules of Civil
Procedure (also effective July 1, 1970), among which was Revised Code § 2323.05.
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It would appear more strongly that the intention of the framers
of Civ. R. 41(A)(1) was to limit the possibility of continuing volun-
tary dismissals possible under R. C. 2323.05, rather than to author-
ize one voluntary dismissal under R.C. 2305.19, which section
speaks only of a dismissal by the plaintiff in the presence of a failure
"otherwise than upon the merits." z
Since the adoption of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Ohio supreme court has not ruled on the status of voluntary dismiss-
als under the Ohio saving statute. However, if it does, its ruling
probably will not differ from that of the Tenth District Court of
Appeals in Brookman or the Ninth District Court of Appeals in
Manos. If rule 41(A) indeed supplants Revised Code § 2323.05, as
seems to be the case,24 then there is no sound reason to speculate that
the Ohio supreme court would treat rule 41 as affecting Revised Code
§ 2305.19 differently than it held that Revised Code § 2323.05 affected
that statute in Beckner.2
B. Other Problems in Determining the Meaning of Failure
"Otherwise than upon the Merits"
In determining what constitutes a failure otherwise than upon
the merits, the courts have struggled with issues other than voluntary
dismissals. In Howard v. Allen,2 the court of appeals for Franklin
County considered, among other things, the meaning of the phrase,
"otherwise than upon the merits." It noted that rule 41(B)(4) enumer-
ates those circumstances that shall operate as a failure otherwise than
upon the merits.2Y The court also pointed out that, in accordance with
2 Brookman v. Northern Trading Co., 33 Ohio App. 2d 250, 254, 294 N.E.2d 912, 915
(1972).
U See note 22 supra.
2 See Beckner n. 16 supra. Whether an action timely commenced which is voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiff comes within the operation of the saving statutes of the various states
which have them should depend primarily on the language of the statute. However, although
these statutes contain far from uniform language, the opposing results which have been reached
in different jurisdictions appear to have been based to a greater extent on differences in judicial
attitude. [See Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1293 (1961)] The statutes of Indiana [Ind. Ann. Stat. tit.
34, art. I, ch. 2, § 8 (Bums 1971)] and Iowa [Iowa Code Ann. § 614.10 (1946)] apply when a
plaintiff fails from any cause "except negligence in the prosecution." In both these states, the
courts have held that a voluntary dismissal constitutes such negligence in the prosecution as to
preclude use of the saving statute. See Pardey v. Town of Mechanicsville, 112 Iowa 68, 83 N.W.
828 (1900); Pennsylvania Co. v. Good, 56 Ind. App. 562, 103 N.E. 672 (1913).
21 28 Ohio App. 2d 275, 277 N.E.2d 239 (1971), affd 30 Ohio St. 2d 130, 283 N.E.2d 167,
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 908 (1972).
21 "A dismissal (a) for lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter, or (b)
for failure to join a party under Rule 19 or Rule 19.1 shall operate as a failure otherwise than
on the merits."
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rule 41(B)(3),28 a court may designate a dismissal as being "otherwise
than on the merits" even though the circumstances surrounding the
dismissal do not coincide with those listed under rule 41(B)(4). Thus,
the practitioner should take special note of the fact that it is often
possible to have the words, "otherwise than upon the merits" added
to the journal entries as insurance against future saving statute prob-
lems. At the time Howard was decided, rule 41(B)(4) included within
its operation a dismissal for improper venue. When rule 41 was
amended, 9 the reference to dismissal for improper venue was deleted.
Thus, it would appear that unless the court in its order of dismissal
specifies otherwise, a dismissal for improper venue might not operate
as a failure otherwise than on the merits."0 Of course, this problem
would arise only in very exceptional circumstances, as Ohio courts
rarely dismiss actions for improper venue, but rather transfer them
to a county where venue is proper according to rule 3(c).
A third problem having to do with the meaning of the phrase
"failure otherwise than on the merits" concerns the date of failure.
The exact date of failure is important because the new action pro-
vided for in Revised Code § 2305.19 must be commenced within one
year of the failure otherwise than on the merits of the first action.
The rule in the majority of jurisdictions is that the date of affirmance
on appeal, and not the date of the trial court's judgment constitutes
the date of failure.3' Early Ohio cases held that the date of failure
was the date of the trial court's judgment,2 but later Ohio cases are
in accord with the majority view.3
The final problem associated with the interpretation of "failure
otherwise than upon the merits" deals with actions that are not gov-
erned by the general statute of limitations. The courts have been
21 "A dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,
except as provided in subsection (4) of this subdivision, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits unless the court, in its order for dismissal, otherwise specifies."
21 Amendment effective July 1, 1971.
1 In Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424 (1965), a case involving impro-
per venue, the United States Supreme Court stated that had petitioner's action arose under
Ohio law, rather than under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, he would have been able to
avail himself of the Ohio saving statute. But see Timens v. Beranrd Pipe Line Co., 4 Ohio App.
2d 249, 212 N.E.2d 73 (1965).
31 See generally, Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1270 (1961).
32 Atcherly v. Dickinson, 34 Ohio St. 537 (1878); Price v. Kobacker Furniture Co., 25
Ohio App. 44, 158 N.E. 551 (1927).
- LaBarbera v. Batsch, 5 Ohio App. 2d 151, 214 N.E.2d 443 (1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 10 Ohio St. 2d 106, 227 N.E.2d 55 (1967); Colello v. Bates, 88 Ohio App. 313, 100
N.E.2d 258 (1950); Albers v. Great Cent. Transp., 32 Ohio Op. 200 (C.P. Hamilton County
1945).
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confronted with the question of whether to allow a new action follow-
ing a failure otherwise than upon the merits in cases involving a
statutory right of action or a contractual right of action, both of
which carry their own limitations period. Ohio courts have held the
saving statute inapplicable to statutory rights of action, 34 since a
limitation contained in a purely statutory right is an inherent part of
the right created, and a lapse of such period operates to extinguish
the right. In addition, Revised Code § 2305.19 must be read in
conjunction with Revised Code §§ 2305.03 to 2305.22, inclusive, and
when so read applies only to actions not otherwise limited by periods
affecting the right of action.3"
However, the courts have taken the opposite view when con-
fronted with contractual limitations. Both the Ohio courts and the
sixth circuit court of appeals have held that the saving statute is not
nullified by a limitation in an insurance policy providing that no
action shall be maintained against the insurance company unless
brought within a certain period after a loss is ascertained." Thus, if
a first action, begun within the limitations period provided by con-
tract, is dismissed otherwise than on the merits after the limitations
period has run, the plaintiff who has so failed may avail himself of
Revised Code § 2305.19.
III. THE MEANING OF "COMMENCED OR ATTEMPTED TO BE
COMMENCED"
The second great pitfall associated with Revised Code § 2305.19
concerns the interpretation of the phrase "commenced or attempted
to be commenced" within the meaning of the statute. In Hoehn v.
Empire Steel Co.,37 the Ohio supreme court stated that a suit must
have been filed in the "proper" court under Revised Code § 2703 .013
11 This is true both of state-created and of federally-created rights. See United States v.
Boomer, 183 F. 726 (8th Cir. 1910); George L. Rackle & Sons Co. v. Western & S. Indem.
Co., 54 Ohio App. 274, 6 N.E.2d 1007 (1936); Purtee v. General Motors Corp., 78 Ohio L.
Abs. 92, 151 N.E.2d 747 (Ct. App. 1956).
15 A civil action, unless a different limitation is prescribed by statute, can be commenced
only within the period prescribed in sections 2305.03 to 2305.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
When interposed by proper plea by a party to an action mentioned in such sections, lapse of
time shall be a bar thereto.
m Leithauser v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 124 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1941); Cortesi v. Firemen's
Fund Ins. Co., 27 Ohio Cir. Dec. 100 (1915); Greulich v. Monnin, 37 Ohio L. Abs. 27, 45
N.E.2d 212 (Ct. App. 1942), affd, 142 Ohio St. 113, 50 N.E.2d 310 (1943).
" 172 Ohio St. 285, 175 N.E.2d 172 (1961).
m A civil action must be commenced by filing in the office of the clerk of the proper court
a petition and causing a summons to be issued thereon.
This section was repealed by Section I of House Bill 1201, effective July 1, 1971, as it
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before the action was commenced under § 2305.17,11 and before the
saving statute could apply.
This requirement was eliminated in Wasyk v. Trent." There, a
plaintiff instituted a civil action in a federal court. The defendant
appeared by counsel and filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
there was no diversity of citizenship. The trial court, after a hearing,
dismissed the action on that ground. The plaintiff then started an
action in an Ohio court and the defendant moved for summary judg-
ment on the ground that the statute of limitations was a bar to the
action. The Ohio supreme court held that the action had been com-
menced in federal court, and that the plaintiff could avail himself of
the Ohio saving statute. Thus, it is clear that jurisdiction of the
subject matter of a case is not a prerequisite to commencement
or attempted commencement of an action within the meaning of
§ 2305.19, Revised Code.
The question of whether a court must obtain in personam juris-
diction over the defendant before an action will be considered
"commenced" or "attempted to be commenced" is a more compli-
cated one. Some early court of appeals decisions indicated that in
personam jurisdiction was not a sine qua non for application of the
saving statute. In Templeman v. Hester,4 the court of appeals for
Hamilton County held that, although no valid service of summons
was obtained in time to commence the action under General Code
§ 11230 (O.R.C. § 2305.17), the plaintiff could avail himself of the
saving statute. The court seemed to say, albeit in a circuitous way,
that the action had been "attempted to be commenced" by the erro-
neous issuance of summons for the defendant as an adult within the
statute of limitations, even though proper service of summons was
not made within sixty days thereafter.
In Haisman v. Crismar,42 another case involving a minor defen-
conflicts with Civ. R. 3(A), which reads "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing."
3' Revised Code § 2305.17, as it read before its amendment in 1965:
An action is commenced within the meaning of sections 2305.03 to 2305.22,
inclusive, and section 1307.08 of the Revised Code, as to each defendant, at the date
of the summons which is served on him or on a codefendant who is a joint contractor,
or otherwise united in interest with him. When service by publication is proper, the
action is commenced at the date of the first publication, if it is regularly made.
Within the meaning of such sections, an attempt to commence an action is
equivalent to its commencement, when the party diligently endeavors to procure a
service, if such attempt is followed by service within sixty days.
174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963).
' 65 Ohio App. 62, 29 N.E.2d 216 (1940).
42 18 Ohio L. Abs. 180 (Ct. App. 1934).
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dant served as an adult, a similar result was reached. The defendant
filed a successful motion to quash the service of summons after the
statute of limitations had run on the ground of minority. The court
of appeals for Mahoning County held that the action was "attempted
to be commenced" by the defective service and that the action was
in fact commenced with service of summons upon the defendant after
she reached the age of majority.
More recent cases have thrown doubt on the issue of whether in
personam jurisdiction is a prerequisite to commencement or at-
tempted commencement of an action. In Kossuth v. Bear,43 the Ohio
supreme court held that there must have been effective service of
summons on a defendant before an action was commenced or at-
tempted to be commenced under Revised Code § 2305.17.
In the 1959 case of Webb v. Chandler," the court of appeals for
Adams County held that regardless of when a petition is filed, a suit
is not "commenced" until a summons is issued which thereafter pro-
perly served on the defendant. In that case, a minor defendant was
served with summons treating him as an adult. After the summons
was set aside because of the defendant's minority, proper service was
not obtained within sixty days, and the court held that the plaintiff's
action was never commenced or attempted to be commenced within
the meaning of Revised Code § 2305.17. Oliver v. Dayton,45 a decision
of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, also required
that proper service be made within sixty days of the filing of a petition
and praecipe.
In Mason v. Waters," the defendant's residence was located near
the border between two counties. In his praecipe, the plaintiff mistak-
enly requested the issuance of a summons to the sheriff of a county
other than the one in which the defendant resided. This summons was
served on the defendant, but was quashed after the running of the
statute of limitations. The Ohio supreme court held that the saving
statute is inapplicable where proper service is not achieved within the
limitation period, holding that in personam jurisdiction is a prere-
quisite to its application.
The supreme court in Mason, as did the courts in Kossuth,
Webb, and Oliver, applied a statutory definition of an attempt to
commence an action. That statute, Revised Code § 2305.17,11 was
161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954).
"110 Ohio App. 193, 168 N.E.2d 906 (1959).
23 Ohio Op. 2d 340, 191 N.E.2d 741 (C.P. Montgomery 1963).
46 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966).
" An action is commenced within the meaning of sections 2305.03 to 2305.22, inclusive,
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amended in 1965 to omit the definition of an "attempt to comm-
ence," thereby modifying the definition of commencement to essen-
tially that contained in rule 3(A).18 It would seem that the 1965
amendment to § 2305.17 would enlarge the application of the saving
statute in those cases where the plaintiff has attempted to commence
his action. As the preceding cases illustrate, prior to the amendment
the courts gave the words "attempted to be commenced" the same
meaning in both Sections 2305.17 and 2305.19.19 This resulted in
greatly limiting the application of the saving statute, as the courts
held that there was no attempt to commence an action unless the
defendant was properly served within sixty days of the date of sum-
mons. Thus, "attempted to be commenced" was denied effect in the
saving statute.
The effect of the amendment should be to make the saving stat-
ute applicable even when the defendant has not been properly served.
The court of appeals for Franklin County seemed to agree in Howard
v. Allen:5"
There is now no definition of what constitutes an action attempted
to be commenced within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19 set forth
either by statute or civil rule. Unless it can be held that the defini-
tion, of an attempt to commence an action, of former R.C. 2305.17
continues to define the terms as used in R.C. 2305.19, it would
appear that the good faith filing of a complaint followed by service
within one year from such filing, which service is later determined
to be ineffective, would constitute an attempt to commence the
action within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19. s1
Although the court in Howard appeared to say that effective
service is not a prerequisite to the application of Revised Code
§ 2305.19, there is some language in the opinion that casts doubt on
this proposition. The court quoted rule 41(B)(4),52 which supplies the
definition of a "failure other than on the merits." Although a dis-
missal for lack of jurisdiction over the person is included, the court
stated:
It is apparent that dismissals for insufficiency of process or
and sections 1302.98 and 1304.29 of the Revised Code, by filing a petition in the office of the
clerk of the proper court together with a praecipe demanding that summons issue or an affidavit
for service by publication, if service is obtained within one year.
"' See note 38 supra.
"' See Mason v. Waters, note 46 supra; Oliver v. Dayton, note 45 supra.
28 Ohio App. 2d 275, 277 N.E.2d 239 (1971).
Id. at 277, 277 N.E.2d at 241.
52 See note 27 supra.
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insufficiency of service of process are not among the dismissals
which Rule 41(B)(4) provides shall operate as failures otherwise
than upon the merits.53
As mentioned earlier, the court did note that rule 41(B)(3) provides
a method for obtaining dismissals otherwise than on the merits for
situations not included under rule 41(B)(4). This method involves
having the trial court, in its order for dismissal, specify that the
dismissal shall not act as an adjudication on the merits.
Thus, the court said in essence that an action cannot fail other-
wise than upon the merits, unless the trial court so specifies in its
order for dismissal, or unless it has been properly commenced, and
not just attempted to be commenced. An action under the amended
provision is not commenced unless valid service is obtained within
one year after filing a praecipe and petition. The decision in Howard
v. Allen was affirmed by the Ohio supreme court on other grounds,
and mention was made neither of the appellate court's definition of
"attempted to be commenced" nor of its reasoning with regard to a
failure other than upon the merits. Hence, the 1965 amendment to
§ 2305.17 has not yet had the beneficial effect of reviving the phrase
"attempted to be commenced" in Revised Code § 2305.19.
There are two additional pitfalls associated with the interpreta-
tion of "commenced or attempted to be commenced" within the
meaning of Revised Code § 2305.19. One minor one was discussed
in the case of Jacobs v. Haggerty.54 In the first action, on the motion
of an adverse party, Jacobs was made a party defendant in a
negligence action arising out of an automobile collision. Jacobs filed
a cross-petition that was thereafter involuntarily dismissed. Jacobs
then filed a new action as plaintiff. The court held that Jacobs had
attempted to commence an action by the filing of his cross-petition,
thereby bringing the second action within the scope of the saving
statute. Thus, the practitioner should be aware that the assertion of
a crossclaim has been held to be a sufficient attempt to assert a right
of action to allow a plaintiff the use of § 2305.19.
A final pitfall often encountered in the interpretation of "com-
menced or attempted to be commenced" within the meaning of the
saving statute concerns the failure of a first suit filed in a state other
than Ohio. In Howard v. Allen,55 the supreme court held that the
Ohio saving statute applies only to actions "commenced or attempted
Howard v. Allen, 28 Ohio App. 2d 275, 278, 277 N.E.2d 239, 241 (1971).
' 97 Ohio App. 553, 127 N.E.2d 775 (1953).
" 30 Ohio St. 2d 130, 283 N.E.2d 167 (1972).
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to be commenced" in Ohio within the appropriate period of limita-
tions.
A suit in another state can no more toll the Ohio statute,
applicable to suits in Ohio, than an unexpired claim under the stat-
ute of another state can operate to lift the statute of limitation and
thereby make the saving clause available. 6
In Andrew v. Bendix Corp.,5 7 the sixth circuit court of appeals
reached a like conclusion one year prior to the decision in Allen.
Numerous other states have held their saving statutes to have no
application in situations in which the first action was brought in a
court, whether state or federal, or in a sister state.5
IV. CONCLUSION
Practitioners must be aware of the pitfalls of the Ohio saving
statute in order to secure its benefits for their clients. Attorneys must
keep in mind the criteria for failure "otherwise than upon the merits"
and "commenced or attempted to be commenced" that have been
developed by the Ohio courts. Although the Ohio supreme court has
stated that the statute is remedial in nature and "is to be given a
liberal construction to permit the decision of cases upon their merits
rather than upon mere technicalities of procedure,"59 in practice
these "mere technicalities of procedure" surrounding Revised Code
§ 2305.19 continue to catch unwary practitioners.
Constance Whyte Reinhard
58 Id. at 134, 283 N.E.2d at 169.
5, 452 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).
Riley v. Union Pac. R.R., 88 F. Supp. 391 (D.C. Wyo. 1950), aff d 182 F.2d 765 (10th
Cir. 1950); Baker v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accident Ass'n of America, 3 App. Div. 2d
265, 161 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1957), appeal dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 828, 150 N.E.2d 233, 173 N.Y.S.2d
803 (1958); Morris v. Wise, 293 P.2d 547 (Okla. 1955); 51 AM. JUR.2d, Limitation of Actions
§ 306 (1970) states "where the action is regarded as controlled by the statute of limitations of
the forum, it has usually been held that a plaintiff invoking the saving statute of the forum may
not rely upon a nonsuit in an earlier action brought in another state."
" Cero Realty Corp. v. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 82, 167 N.E.2d 774
(1960).
